Fannie Mae Delinquencies: October 2011

The latest release of the Fannie Mae Monthly Summary indicated that total serious single family delinquency went flat in October while remaining at distressed levels.

In October, 3.11% of non-credit enhanced loans went seriously delinquent while the level was 9.41% of credit enhanced loans resulting in an overall total single family delinquency of 4%.

The following charts (click for larger ultra-dynamic and surf-able chart) show what Fannie Mae terms the count of “Seriously Delinquent” loans as a percentage of all loans on their books.

It’s important to understand that Fannie Mae does NOT segregate foreclosures from delinquent loans when reporting these numbers.

Fannie Mae Delinquencies: August 2011

The latest release of the Fannie Mae Monthly Summary indicated that total serious single family delinquency declined while still remaining at distressed levels.

In August, 3.10% of non-credit enhanced loans went seriously delinquent while the level was 9.57% of credit enhanced loans resulting in an overall total single family delinquency of 4.03%.

The following charts (click for larger ultra-dynamic and surf-able chart) show what Fannie Mae terms the count of “Seriously Delinquent” loans as a percentage of all loans on their books.

It’s important to understand that Fannie Mae does NOT segregate foreclosures from delinquent loans when reporting these numbers.

Fannie Mae Delinquencies: June 2011

The latest release of the Fannie Mae Monthly Summary indicated that for data through June, total serious single family delinquency declined while still remaining at distressed levels.

In June, 3.14% of non-credit enhanced loans went seriously delinquent while the level was 9.72% of credit enhanced loans resulting in an overall total single family delinquency of 4.08%.

The following charts (click for larger ultra-dynamic and surf-able chart) show what Fannie Mae terms the count of “Seriously Delinquent” loans as a percentage of all loans on their books.

It’s important to understand that Fannie Mae does NOT segregate foreclosures from delinquent loans when reporting these numbers.

Fannie Mae Delinquencies: April 2011

The latest release of the Fannie Mae Monthly Summary indicated that for data through March, total serious single family delinquency declined notably while still remaining at distressed levels.

In March, 3.26% of non-credit enhanced loans went seriously delinquent while the level was 10.13% of credit enhanced loans resulting in an overall total single family delinquency of 4.27%.

The following charts (click for larger ultra-dynamic and surf-able chart) show what Fannie Mae terms the count of “Seriously Delinquent” loans as a percentage of all loans on their books.

It’s important to understand that Fannie Mae does NOT segregate foreclosures from delinquent loans when reporting these numbers.

Fannie Mae Delinquencies: March 2011

The latest release of the Fannie Mae Monthly Summary indicated that for data through February, total serious single family delinquency continued to declined though at a notably slower pace than in recent months.

In January, 3.39% of non-credit enhanced loans went seriously delinquent while the level was 10.53% of credit enhanced loans resulting in an overall total single family delinquency of 4.44%.

The following charts (click for larger ultra-dynamic and surf-able chart) show what Fannie Mae terms the count of “Seriously Delinquent” loans as a percentage of all loans on their books.

It’s important to understand that Fannie Mae does NOT segregate foreclosures from delinquent loans when reporting these numbers.

Fannie Mae Delinquencies: February 2011

The latest release of the Fannie Mae Monthly Summary indicated that for data through January, total serious single family delinquency continued to declined though at a notably slower pace than in recent months.

In January, 3.38% of non-credit enhanced loans went seriously delinquent while the level was 10.55% of credit enhanced loans resulting in an overall total single family delinquency of 4.45%.

The following charts (click for larger ultra-dynamic and surf-able chart) show what Fannie Mae terms the count of “Seriously Delinquent” loans as a percentage of all loans on their books.

It’s important to understand that Fannie Mae does NOT segregate foreclosures from delinquent loans when reporting these numbers.

Fannie Mae Delinquencies: January 2011

The latest release of the Fannie Mae Monthly Summary indicated that for data through December, total serious single family delinquency continued to declined though at a notably slower pace than in recent months while the credit enhanced component went delinquent at a higher rate.

In December, 3.40% of non-credit enhanced loans went seriously delinquent while the level was 10.6% of credit enhanced loans resulting in an overall total single family delinquency of 4.48%.

The following charts (click for larger ultra-dynamic and surf-able chart) show what Fannie Mae terms the count of “Seriously Delinquent” loans as a percentage of all loans on their books.

It’s important to understand that Fannie Mae does NOT segregate foreclosures from delinquent loans when reporting these numbers.

Ticking Prime Bomb!: Fannie Mae Monthly Summary May 2010

The Latest release of the Fannie Mae Monthly Summary for May indicated that for data through April, total serious single family delinquency declined slightly.

Although this is a notable development particularly in light of the fact that Fannie Mae’s serious delinquency had been rising for over two years, more data is needed before any conclusions can be drawn as to the trend going forward.

For March, 3.89% of non-credit enhanced loans went seriously delinquent while the level was 12.55% of credit enhanced loans resulting in an overall total single family delinquency of 5.30%.

The following charts (click for larger ultra-dynamic and surf-able chart) show what Fannie Mae terms the count of “Seriously Delinquent” loans as a percentage of all loans on their books.

It’s important to understand that Fannie Mae does NOT segregate foreclosures from delinquent loans when reporting these numbers.

Ticking Prime Bomb!: Fannie Mae Monthly Summary March 2010

Today’s release of the Fannie Mae Monthly Summary for April indicated that for data through March, total serious single family delinquency declined slightly.

Although this is a notable development particularly in light of the fact that Fannie Mae’s serious delinquency has been rising for roughly 33 consecutive months, more data is needed before any conclusions can be drawn as to the trend going forward.

For March, 3.90% of non-credit enhanced loans went seriously delinquent while the level was 13.29% of credit enhanced loans resulting in an overall total single family delinquency of 5.47%.

The following charts (click for larger ultra-dynamic and surf-able chart) show what Fannie Mae terms the count of “Seriously Delinquent” loans as a percentage of all loans on their books.

It’s important to understand that Fannie Mae does NOT segregate foreclosures from delinquent loans when reporting these numbers.

Ticking Prime Bomb!: Fannie Mae Monthly Summary January 2010

Decades from now the summer of 2008 will likely be remembered to mark the turning point where legislative blundering took an otherwise serious financial crisis and molested it into an epic financial disaster.

By fully assuming the liabilities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two colossal and corrupt (and conduit of corruptness funneling junk Countrywide Financial loans onto the implied balance sheet of the federal government) government sponsored enterprises, the federal government, led by Treasury Secretary Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, thrust taxpayers into an abyss of insolvency with one mighty shove.

The following charts (click for larger ultra-dynamic and surf-able chart) show what Fannie Mae terms the count of “Seriously Delinquent” loans as a percentage of all loans on their books.

Notice that despite all the government gimmicks and manipulation the level of delinquency at these two mortgage giants continues to mount.

It’s important to understand that Fannie Mae does NOT segregate foreclosures from delinquent loans when reporting these numbers.

Finally, the following chart (click for larger ultra-dynamic and surf-able chart) shows the relative movements of Fannie Mae’s credit enhanced and non-credit enhanced (insured and non-insured) “Seriously Delinquent” loans.

Ticking Prime Bomb!: Fannie Mae Monthly Summary November 2009

Decades from now the summer of 2008 will likely be remembered to mark the turning point where legislative blundering took an otherwise serious financial crisis and molested it into an epic financial collapse.

By fully assuming the liabilities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two colossal and corrupt (and conduit of corruptness funneling junk Countrywide Financial loans onto the implied balance sheet of the federal government) government sponsored enterprises, the federal government, led by Treasury Secretary Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, has thrust taxpayers into an abyss of insolvency with one mighty shove.

Given the sheer size of these government sponsored companies, with loan guarantee obligations recently estimated by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis President William Poole of totaling $4.47 Trillion (That’s TRILLION with a capital T… for perspective ALL U.S. government debt held by the public totals roughly $4.87 Trillion) this legislative reversal making certain the “implied” government guarantee is reckless to say the least.

The following chart (click for larger ultra-dynamic and surf-able chart) shows what Fannie Mae terms the count of “Seriously Delinquent” loans as a percentage of all loans on their books.

It’s important to understand that Fannie Mae does NOT segregate foreclosures from delinquent loans when reporting these numbers.

Finally, the following chart (click for larger ultra-dynamic and surf-able chart) shows the relative movements of Fannie Mae’s credit and non-credit enhanced (insured and non-insured) “Seriously Delinquent” loans.

Ticking Prime Bomb!: Fannie Mae Monthly Summary June 2009

Decades from now the summer of 2008 will likely be remembered to mark the turning point where legislative blundering took an otherwise serious financial crisis and molested it into an epic financial collapse.

By fully assuming the liabilities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two colossal and corrupt (and conduit of corruptness funneling junk Countrywide Financial loans onto the implied balance sheet of the federal government) government sponsored enterprises, the federal government, led by Treasury Secretary Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, has thrust taxpayers into an abyss of insolvency with one mighty shove.

Given the sheer size of these government sponsored companies, with loan guarantee obligations recently estimated by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis President William Poole of totaling $4.47 Trillion (That’s TRILLION with a capital T… for perspective ALL U.S. government debt held by the public totals roughly $4.87 Trillion) this legislative reversal making certain the “implied” government guarantee is reckless to say the least.

The following chart (click for larger ultra-dynamic and surf-able chart) shows what Fannie Mae terms the count of “Seriously Delinquent” loans as a percentage of all loans on their books.

It’s important to understand that Fannie Mae does NOT segregate foreclosures from delinquent loans when reporting these numbers.

Finally, the following chart (click for larger ultra-dynamic and surf-able chart) shows the relative movements of Fannie Mae’s credit and non-credit enhanced (insured and non-insured) “Seriously Delinquent” loans.

Ticking Time Bomb?: Fannie Mae Monthly Summary March 2009

Decades from now the summer of 2008 will likely be remembered to mark the turning point where legislative blundering took an otherwise serious financial crisis and molested it into an epic financial collapse.

By fully assuming the liabilities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two colossal and corrupt (and conduit of corruptness funneling junk Countrywide Financial loans onto the implied balance sheet of the federal government) government sponsored enterprises, the federal government, led by Treasury Secretary Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, has thrust taxpayers into an abyss of insolvency with one mighty shove.

Given the sheer size of these government sponsored companies, with loan guarantee obligations recently estimated by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis President William Poole of totaling $4.47 Trillion (That’s TRILLION with a capital T… for perspective ALL U.S. government debt held by the public totals roughly $4.87 Trillion) this legislative reversal making certain the “implied” government guarantee is reckless to say the least.

The following chart (click for larger) shows what Fannie Mae terms the count of “Seriously Delinquent” loans as a percentage of all loans on their books.

It’s important to understand that Fannie Mae does NOT segregate foreclosures from delinquent loans when reporting these numbers and that should they report the delinquent results as a percentage of the unpaid principle balance, things might likely look a lot worse.

Finally, the following chart (click for larger) shows the relative movements of Fannie Mae’s credit and non-credit enhanced (insured and non-insured) “Seriously Delinquent” loans.

Ticking Time Bomb?: Fannie Mae Monthly Summary January 2009

Decades from now the summer of 2008 will likely be remembered to mark the turning point where legislative blundering took an otherwise serious financial crisis and molested it into an epic financial collapse.

By fully assuming the liabilities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two colossal and corrupt (and conduit of corruptness funneling junk Countrywide Financial loans onto the implied balance sheet of the federal government) government sponsored enterprises, the federal government, led by Treasury Secretary Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, has thrust taxpayers into an abyss of insolvency with one mighty shove.

Given the sheer size of these government sponsored companies, with loan guarantee obligations recently estimated by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis President William Poole of totaling $4.47 Trillion (That’s TRILLION with a capital T… for perspective ALL U.S. government debt held by the public totals roughly $4.87 Trillion) this legislative reversal making certain the “implied” government guarantee is reckless to say the least.

The following chart (click for larger) shows what Fannie Mae terms the count of “Seriously Delinquent” loans as a percentage of all loans on their books.

It’s important to understand that Fannie Mae does NOT segregate foreclosures from delinquent loans when reporting these numbers and that should they report the delinquent results as a percentage of the unpaid principle balance, things might likely look a lot worse.

Finally, the following chart (click for larger) shows the relative movements of Fannie Mae’s credit and non-credit enhanced (insured and non-insured) “Seriously Delinquent” loans.

Ticking Time Bomb?: Fannie Mae Monthly Summary October 2008

Decades from now the summer of 2008 will likely be remembered to mark the turning point where legislative blundering took an otherwise serious financial crisis and molested it into an epic financial collapse.

By fully assuming the liabilities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two colossal and corrupt (and conduit of corruptness funneling junk Countrywide Financial loans onto the implied balance sheet of the federal government) government sponsored enterprises, the federal government, led by Treasury Secretary Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, has thrust taxpayers into an abyss of insolvency with one mighty shove.

Given the sheer size of these government sponsored companies, with loan guarantee obligations recently estimated by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis President William Poole of totaling $4.47 Trillion (That’s TRILLION with a capital T… for perspective ALL U.S. government debt held by the public totals roughly $4.87 Trillion) this legislative reversal making certain the “implied” government guarantee is reckless to say the least.

The following chart (click for larger) shows what Fannie Mae terms the count of “Seriously Delinquent” loans as a percentage of all loans on their books.

It’s important to understand that Fannie Mae does NOT segregate foreclosures from delinquent loans when reporting these numbers and that should they report the delinquent results as a percentage of the unpaid principle balance, things might likely look a lot worse.

Finally, the following chart (click for larger) shows the relative movements of Fannie Mae’s credit and non-credit enhanced (insured and non-insured) “Seriously Delinquent” loans.

Question(s) of The Day - FDIC Freebie?

The proposed FDIC homeowner bailout initiative has been reported to have an objective of reducing monthly payments for delinquent borrowers to a level that they can afford… Won’t this simply encourage others to become delinquents?

Why spend 50% of your take home income on the mortgage when, with the government’s help, you can spend just 30%?

Is implementing this type of policy the proper role of the FDIC?

Goin’ Up-Prime!: Hudson City Bancorp Prime Losses Q3 2008

I’ve been arguing for the better part of two years that although the traditional media and apparently general consensus has focused on subprime and other “toxic” mortgage products as the source for the credit tumult, the historic deterioration would by no means be limited to these “bleeding edge” products.

Before this massive housing and general economic contraction is complete, I expect to see new records set for prime defaults, be they prime-Jumbo ARM loans, prime-Jumbo fixed rate loans, prime-conforming ARM loans or prime-conforming fixed rate loans… we will see historic defaults across the entire spectrum of mortgage products.

Although there is significant debate about the true drivers of mortgage default, most individuals in default cite unemployment as the cause while other key instigators are: risky or insufficient household financial planning (high consumer debt and low/no savings), low-equity stake and housing depreciation, and simply general recession.

The key point to consider though is that while all of these factors have contributed to creating environments of high mortgage default in the past, our current circumstances make these past periods look like walks in the park.

In an effort to prove out this conjecture, I will track, with a quarterly recurring post, the operating performance of one of today’s most celebrated “conservative” mortgage portfolio lenders, Hudson City Bancorp (NYSE:HCBK), to see how their borrowers perform over the course of this economic downturn.

Hudson City is now fully recognized as the “poster child” for safe prime-only mortgage lending, stringent underwriting standards and a CEO, Ronald Hermance, whose frequent media appearances usually come with heaping portions of high praise and accolades.

It’s important to understand that although Hudson City’s average borrower has a reasonable LTV of 61.5%, they are still seeing a precipitous increase in loan defaults.

In fact, currently the average LTV of their non-performing loans (defaulted loans) is 69% so “prime” borrowers with 31% equity at the time of origination are now defaulting in steadily increasing numbers.

The following chart plots Hudson City Bancorp’s Non-Performing Loan Ratio (defaulted loans to total loan portfolio) since Q1 2004.

Notice that defaults have been on the rise since Q2 2006 while in Q2 2007 things really started to heat up.


But how does the growth in defaults of the Hudson City Bancorp “prime” portfolio stack up compared to other well know default rates?

The Following charts compare the Hudson City default rate to that of Fannie Mae and the MBAA foreclosure rate.

The top chart compares the normalized default rates since Q1 2004 while the lower two compare the same data since Q1 2007 in order to get a sense of the respective growth over these periods.

It’s important to keep in mind that although Hudson City is not experiencing the same ratio of defaults (Fannie Mae and the general MBAA rates are worse) the growth of prime defaults is comparable and, since Q1 2007, has even been substantially higher.



As for Hudson City loan loss provisions, as you can see from the following chart, the capital cushion is dwindling while loan losses climb.

The key instigators in this growth of default is likely home price depreciation and unemployment both working together to bear down on “prime” homeowners as is shown by the following charts plotting the year-over-year percent change to the New York area S&P/Case-Shiller home price index against the Hudson City default ratio as well as the unemployment in New York and New Jersey since 2004.


I will continue to update this data in coming quarters in order to see how slumping home values and rising unemployment affect the performance of “prime” borrowers.