Winding Down Fannie and Freddie Starts with Loan Limits

There is probably no better representation of the insanity that swept the nation during the housing mania and just after the collapse than the treatment of the conforming loan limit.

To recap, let’s recall that the “conforming” loan limit sets the maximum loan amount, for which the GSEs (Fannie and Freddie) are allowed to purchase an individual loan.

If a loan is larger than this limit, it is considered a “jumbo” loan and is automatically disqualified from being sponsored by Fannie and Freddie, thus it would have to be handled by the private market (private banks/lenders).

This was a simple enough system whereby one basic piece of underwriting criteria was one of several (there are many other bits of criteria that qualify a “conforming” loan… here we are just concerned with the loan size limit) straightforward qualifying factors dictating whether the government would sponsor a home loan or not.

Now, using the system that was in place before the collapse, this limit would be recalculated once a year using source data from the FHFA… in short, the FHFA would take the October median sales data and use it (along with other procedures) as the basis for the conforming loan limit for the following year.

This meant that, in theory, the conforming loan limits could rise and fall based on the trend of the FHFAs median home price… in theory that is…

Throughout the boom the median prices were rising substantially year after year and, like a good little policy mechanism, the conforming limit was being adjusted up to match the historic run-up in prices and by the peak the limit stood at $417K.

When the housing market soured in 2006 and 2007 though, OFHEO (the Office of Housing Enterprise Oversight… the former regulator of Fannie and Freddie) had to face up to the task of decreasing the loan limit as median prices fell nationwide.

Well, as is typical of this period and of government in general, OFHEO was unable to stand the pressure coming from misguided lawmakers and those with private real estate interests, and simply choose to postpone and decision leaving the conforming loan limit at the prior level.

Then from this point on things really ran amuck… OFHEO came up with a series of haphazard procedures that somehow justified the current limit and stalled further any downward adjustment.

Then, to make matters worse, lawmakers simply refashioned the whole process dismantling the original mechanism entirely and installing a different system whereby a different limit was set for each metropolitan area in the country.

By this point there were areas across the country that had loan limits well over $700K…

So, the dilemma started with OFHEO needing to reduce the limit from $417K and after Washington lawmakers got through with it, the limit was increased to over $700K.

This was a prime example of policy gone wild… While regulators were happy to raise the limit with accuracy each year as prices were rising, they had flatly refused to decrease it as the market soured and finally completely went haywire as the housing collapse stirred panic.

Lawmakers and regulators might say that they were doing the work of the people, stepping in to fill the shoes of a private Jumbo market that refused to lend as the housing market crumbled.

I counter that they worked to encourage the boom by increasing the loan limit (thus pushing up conforming and jumbo loan sizes) continually and supplying endless liquidity for speculators (typical homebuyers and investors) to use to sink themselves in mountains of debt and needlessly inflate the prices of an essential service.

When the market turned, which simply represented reality re-materializing, the housing markets didn’t need more liquidity, they needed less.

The whole public government sponsored scheme of housing debt markets has been an abysmal failure and the conforming loan limit tomfoolery outlined above is but one example of government idiocy run amuck.

The Obama administration is doing the right thing in proposing the winding down of the GSEs and coming out in favor of allowing the elevated conforming loan limit policy to expire this fall.

Lower limits will mean higher interest rates for many homebuyers, particularly those buying homes in excess of $500K, but the intention of the original GSE policy was never to liquefy the top of the market, it was supposed to bring liquidity to the middle class and below.

Pending Home Sales: February 2008

Today, the National Association of Realtors (NAR) released their Pending Home Sales Report for February showing a weakening to existing home sales activity and a clear continuation of the historic decline to residential housing on a year-over-year basis, both nationally and across every region.

As the decline in demand for residential housing slumps through its third year, it’s important to consider the significance of both the extent of the decline and the severity of the oncoming declines to existing home sales activity clearly indicated by the current 21.4% year-over-year drop-off in pending home sales.

It is very likely that we are now seeing the spiraling feedback effect of sharply declining prices and both the palpable sense and actual effects of recession working to depress buyer confidence thereby causing continued even accelerating declines in housing demand.

As usual, NAR Senior Economist Laurence Yun continues his attempts at self interested spin and false optimism suggesting that home sales will rise “notably” by the second half of the year as a result of the new super jumbo GSE “conforming” loan limits.

“We’re looking for essentially stable sales in the near term, before higher mortgage loan limits translate into more sales in high-cost markets. The wider access to affordable credit should increase sales activity notably this summer as pent-up demand begins to be met.”

The following chart shows the national pending homes sales index since 2005 compared monthly. Notice that each year, the months value is decreasing consistently (click for larger version).

The following chart shows the national pending home sales index along with the percent change on a year-over-year basis as well as the percent change from the peak set in 2005 (click for larger version).

Note that in the above charts, I had to use the Not Seasonally Adjusted (NSA) data series as NAR changed the methodology for their Seasonally Adjusted (SA) series a while back and never republished the numbers.

Look at February’s seasonally adjusted pending home sales results and draw your own conclusion:

• Nationally the index was down 21.4% as compared to February 2007.
• The Northeast region was down 25.4% as compared to February 2007.
• The Midwest region was down 17.4% as compared to February 2007.
• The South region was down 30.3% as compared to February 2007.
• The West region was down 17.1% as compared to February 2007.

Ticking Time Bomb?: Fannie Mae Monthly Summary January 2008

It appears now completely certain that the federal government, in attempting to “bail out” market participants that are hopelessly overleveraged and markets that are wholly overvalued, will lean on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by expanding their operations to include massive Jumbo loans.

It’s important to note that these changes are taking place with no required modifications to the GSEs operational practices and no additional powers granted to their Federal regulator the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO).

Given the sheer size of these government sponsored companies, with loan guarantee obligations recently estimated by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis President William Poole of totaling $4.47 Trillion (That’s TRILLION with a capital T… for perspective ALL U.S. government debt held by the public totals roughly $4.87 Trillion) and the “fuzzy” interpretation of their “implied” overall Federal government guarantee should they experience systemic crisis, these changes are reckless to say the least.

One key to understanding the potential risk that these entities face as the nation’s housing markets continue to slide lies in considering their current lending practices.

Although it’s been widely assumed by many that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have utilized a more conservative and risk averse standard for their loan operations, it now appears that that assumption is weak.

Whether it’s their subprime loan production, low-no down payment “prime” lending practices, or their conforming loan-piggyback loophole, the GSEs participated as aggressively in the lending boom as any of the now infamous bankrupt or near-bankrupt mortgage lenders.

Additionally, it’s important to understand that Countrywide Financial (NYSE:CFC) has been and continues to be Fannie Mae’s largest lender customer and servicer responsible for 28% (up from 26% in FY 2006) of Fannies credit book of business.

To that end, let’s compare the performance of Fannie Mae’s operations with that of Countrywide Financial.

The following chart (click for larger) shows what Fannie Mae terms the count of “Seriously Delinquent” loans as a percentage of all loans on their books.

It’s important to understand that Fannie Mae does NOT segregate foreclosures from delinquent loans when reporting these numbers and that should they report the delinquent results as a percentage of the unpaid principle balance, things would likely look a lot worse.

In order to get a better sense of the relative performance of Fannie Mae as compared to Countrywide Financial, the following chart (click for larger) compares Fannie Mae’s “Seriously Delinquent” loans (which include foreclosures) to Countrywide Financials loans in foreclosure.

Finally, the following chart (click for larger) shows the relative movements of Fannie Mae’s credit and non-credit enhanced (insured and non-insured) “Seriously Delinquent” loans versus Countrywide Financials delinquencies as a percentage of total loans.

OFHEO Home Price Index: Q3 2007

Yesterday, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) published their Home Price Index (HPI) data for Q3 2007 showing continued deceleration of home price appreciation in most regions as well as a broadening of outright declines now including 23 states declining from their respective peaks and 11 states declining on a year-over-year basis.

Topping the list of peak decliners by state is Michigan at -9.22%, California at -8.52%, Nevada at -6.43%, Rhode Island at -5.45%, Massachusetts at -5.14%, Florida at -4.81% and New Hampshire at -2.22%.

Topping the list of year-over-year decliners by state is California at -7.24%, Michigan at -7.07%, Nevada at -6.43%, Florida at -4.56%, Rhode Island at -3.16% and Massachusetts at -3.01%.


The OFHEO HPI series is formulated from home purchase and refinance information collected from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and as such suffers slightly from some basic limitations of the data.

First, Fannie and Freddie mortgages are subject to conforming loan limits which eliminates huge portions of data that are particularly relevant given the current bloated state of home prices.

A great percentage of home purchases made in the last decade, especially in the bubbliest areas, were made with Jumbo loans that, by their definition, exceed the Fannie-Freddie conforming loan limits and as such are not included in the OFHEO data.

Also, data from mortgages made for the purpose of refinance are also included which may have a tendency to skew the HPI series.

Fortunately, OFHEO now produces “Purchase Only” indices (i.e. HPI indices derived only from home purchase mortgage data only) for all census and states statistical areas.

In general, because the “Purchase Only” indices are based on home price changes from only home purchase transactions, they tend to show a greater degree of deceleration and/or decline than the complete data indices and may be a better indicator of the overall state of each particular housing market.

Although it’s generally recognized that the S&P/Case-Shiller (CSI) home price indices are more accurate than the OFHEO indices, OFHEO offers data for over 400 different census, state and metropolitan statistical areas compared to only 20 major metro areas for the CSI.

I have released a new version of the OFHEO HPI Charting Tool updating the data as well as adding some additional features that make the tool more useful and fixing a few bugs to boot!

The OFHEO HPI Charting Tool allows you to visualize the HPI data as well as compare data from different areas.

Additionally, the tool now fully supports the “Purchase Only” data as well as allowing you to “normalize” the data in order to make a true comparison from one area to another.

The Almost Daily 2¢ - Freddie’s Delinquents

The latest turmoil concerning Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae likely represents one of the most significant blows to have hit the housing markets and the overall economy since the start of this historic downturn.

Given the eroding results of Freddie Mac's third quarter operations and other tumultuous events, there has been a clear loss in confidence in these two government sponsored enterprises (GSE) both closing the door to many of the proposed opportunities for market relief and further revealing the true extent of the housing decline.

Putting aside the recent “fuzzy math” episode, today Freddie Mac has disclosed a tremendous deterioration of mortgage credit in the third quarter of 2007 resulting in a whopping $1.2 billion of expenses (this is technically a 971% increase in expenses over the same quarter last year) related to increasing loan loss provisions and REO (real estate owned) operations.

Although, Freddie Mac’s single family delinquency rate has been rising and now stands at .51% of their current mortgage holdings, that number EXCLUDES losses coming from their more risky “Structured Security” transactions and delinquent loans that have had their terms modified under individual agreements with borrowers.

The unpaid principle balance of Freddie’s single family "Structured Transactions" as of September 30, 2007 was $20.2 billion, representing approximately 1% of their total mortgage portfolio and carrying a delinquency rate of a staggering 9.0%.

Keep in mind, this is the government sponsored “conforming loan” market we are talking about.

Both Freddie and Fannie, being highly regulated, are presumed to have adhered to a greater degree of standards when transacting mortgages.

Obviously, we are now seeing a clear indication of a substantial deterioration of the near-prime and prime mortgage markets.

Additionally, given the current circumstances, I believe it is safe to say that any opportunity for either Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac to assist the Jumbo loan market, as has been suggested by both Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) and Federal Reserve Chainman Ben Bernanke, is now totally gone.

The Daily 2¢ - Federal Nonconformists

I can't think of a more preposterous and irrational example of exuberant upside bias on the part of the Federal government then that of the recent toiling over the OFHEO conforming loan limit.

For those of you that are not yet familiar, the Office of Federal Housing Oversight (OFHEO) is the government agency that is responsible for regulating the two primary Government Sponsored Enterprise (GSE) mortgage giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

One of the main, if not THE main, role of OFHEO is to set the “conforming loan limit”, a maximum loan value that is used to act as the threshold between a “safe” loan that Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae are allowed to purchase and an “unsafe and unsound” loan “running contrary to statute”.

This is how the “conforming” vs. “Jumbo” loan is defined… below the limit is “conforming” above is non-agency “Jumbo”.

Currently, the limit for a single family home is $417,000, pretty frothy when you consider that, only as far back as 2000, the limit stood at $252,700.

Keep in mind that this means that an average home buyer can go to a mortgage broker, bank or other lender and borrow as much as $417,000 of home loan principle and still remain eligible for GSE underwriting that carries a lower rate of interest since GSE loans are assumed to be backed by the full faith and credit of the federal government (this assumption is really a bit of a myth… but that’s a post for another day when things really start to quake!).

So how is it, you ask, that the limit nearly doubled in roughly 5 years (keep in mind, it was set to $417,000 in November 2005)?

Easy, when the home prices went up, they simply raised the value (for more detailed information on how they change the limit, see my prior post on the subject).

But now comes the sticky part… now that home prices are going down, what are they doing to the limit?

The answer is surprise… OFHEO is coming up with all sorts of oddball ways of keeping from having to lower the limit (see my past two posts on the subject)

In fact, in 2006 when home prices declined which, according to their prior inflating methodology, should have resulted in a reduction of the conforming loan limit, OFHEO revised their guidelines and left the limit unchanged.

Now in 2007, home prices are going to fall again, only this time by a likely far more significant percentage and what has OFHEO done in response?

They have revised the guidelines once again, effectively postponing any decrease until certain conditions are met (again, see my prior post on the subject).

After soliciting public comment in June and July about the proposed changes to the guidelines, OFHEO received a number of respondents, particularly the National Association of Realtors (NAR), the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) and the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) as well as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and a whole raft of two-bit mortgage lenders who expressed clear opposition to the changes NOT because they would leave the limit unchanged BUT because they feel OFHEO should NEVER LOWER THE LIMIT!

ONLY UP... NEVER DOWN!

If that weren’t outrageous enough, there has been much talk for the last few days coming from Congressional figures such as Representative Barney Frank (D-MA), the Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, who actually prefers that the limit be INCREASED, even in the face of two years falling home prices!

The point of this, obviously, would be simply to force Fannie and Freddie to effectively “re-liquefy” the now totally stalled Jumbo market.

Apparently though, both Treasury Secretary Paulson, and Senate Banking Chairman Dodd (D-CT) have expressed that it will take specific legislative action in order to allow OFHEO to raise the conforming limit above the current level.

Now, I’m not very sure why they have concluded this as OFHEO just modified its procedures for lowering the value without any legislative debate whatsoever, but it really makes no difference.

If you listen closely to Dodd, Frank and Paulson, they are all saying the same thing namely it will take legislative action and the legislation is on the way.

This is one of the most egregious examples of a dimwitted Congressional-Federal assault on the “free” markets I have ever seen.

They, in the supposed well meaning attempt to help “average” Americans, are essentially attempting to control the market price of residential real estate.

Don’t underestimate the severity of this fumbling.

To put it in better perspective, it has recently been estimated (in Dean Bakers latest excellent paper... hat-tip HousingPanic) that there is anywhere between $4 to $8 TRILLION of housing equity that will be lost in the process of deflating (re-pricing) the housing bubble, bringing prices back to hundred year historical averages.

That’s nearly 2 – 4 times larger than the entire 2008 Fiscal Year Federal Budget.

This means the by finagling with things like the conforming loan limit, mortgage bailout funds and foreclosure timeouts, the Federal government is attempting to use both taxpayer dollars and the full faith and credit of our government in order to maintain absurdly inflated housing values and the artificial wealth this boom created.

This would clearly create a moral hazard of unparalleled proportions.

Remember, Jumbo loans were most frequently used by upper middle class affluent home buyers, and for the ones that are now in trouble, the ride down will be painful.

But that is the price you pay for taking a risk in a “free” market.
And who better to take this hit than Americans with generally good incomes and employment opportunities.

If the government is smart it will allow this natural correction to take place unfettered, permitting scores of Americans to learn a valuable life lesson.