The Lowdown on QRM Down

The nation’s housing finance scheme has probably never seen such unrest… a cataclysmic crash sending the majority of private institutions either belly-up or running for the hills… the total failure of the massive government-sponsored enterprises… scores of bankrupt brokers… millions of foreclosures… it is an utter wasteland.

Now that the smoke is slowly clearing, we are seeing the initial signs of a re-birth or sorts… a new housing finance scheme is emerging with the potential to address many of the most blatant errors of the past.

The Obama administration recently released their proposal to reduce the government’s footprint in housing finance by winding down the participation of Fannie and Freddie and constructing policy that would limit government involvement in mortgage lending.

One item cited in the Obama plan was the implementation of the “retained risk” provision of the Dodd-Frank Act and the creation of a “Qualified Residential Mortgage” (QRM) definition.

The “retained risk” provision mandates that originators or securitizers of mortgage securities retain 5% of a securities credit risk when sold to investors.

The QRM will provide a standard for underwriting that, if met, would exempt a security from the retained risk provision so long as the mortgages packaged into the security meet that standard.

One QRM provision that has been vigorously debated is the minimum down-payment to require from borrowers.

Some banks have supported 10% or less while other banks have been pushing for 20% or more but while their reasons for favoring one percentage or another could vary dramatically, their efforts to influence this part of the regulations are not necessarily driven by their altruistic urge create a more resilient housing finance scheme but rather to defend of their own competitive positions.

In any event, the 20% figure would likely strike the best balance between attainability and financial prudence and hopefully will be the level that prevails when regulators finalize the provision later this month.

Further, a 20% down-payment standard would represent a decisive shift away from the reckless lending days of the past and a significant turn in the direction of real prudence.

One important issue that will need to be answered after the adoption of the QRM is whether or to what extent the GSEs (Fannie, Freddie, etc.) and FHA will be bound by the standard as well.

Ticking Prime Bomb!: Fannie Mae Monthly Summary December 2010

The Latest release of the Fannie Mae Monthly Summary for December indicated that for data through November, total serious single family delinquency continued to declined though at a notably slower pace than in recent months.

In November, 3.42% of non-credit enhanced loans went seriously delinquent while the level was 10.54% of credit enhanced loans resulting in an overall total single family delinquency of 4.50%.

The following charts (click for larger ultra-dynamic and surf-able chart) show what Fannie Mae terms the count of “Seriously Delinquent” loans as a percentage of all loans on their books.

It’s important to understand that Fannie Mae does NOT segregate foreclosures from delinquent loans when reporting these numbers.

Ticking Prime Bomb!: Fannie Mae Monthly Summary December 2009

Decades from now the summer of 2008 will likely be remembered to mark the turning point where legislative blundering took an otherwise serious financial crisis and molested it into an epic financial disaster.

By fully assuming the liabilities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two colossal and corrupt (and conduit of corruptness funneling junk Countrywide Financial loans onto the implied balance sheet of the federal government) government sponsored enterprises, the federal government, led by Treasury Secretary Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, thrust taxpayers into an abyss of insolvency with one mighty shove.

Given the sheer size of these government sponsored "companies", with loan guarantee obligations recently estimated by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis President William Poole of totaling $4.47 Trillion (That’s TRILLION with a capital T… for perspective ALL U.S. government debt held by the public totals roughly $4.87 Trillion) this legislative reversal making certain the “implied” government guarantee is reckless to say the least.

The following chart (click for larger ultra-dynamic and surf-able chart) shows what Fannie Mae terms the count of “Seriously Delinquent” loans as a percentage of all loans on their books.

It’s important to understand that Fannie Mae does NOT segregate foreclosures from delinquent loans when reporting these numbers.

Finally, the following chart (click for larger ultra-dynamic and surf-able chart) shows the relative movements of Fannie Mae’s credit and non-credit enhanced (insured and non-insured) “Seriously Delinquent” loans.

Ticking Prime Bomb!: Fannie Mae Monthly Summary October 2009

Decades from now the summer of 2008 will likely be remembered to mark the turning point where legislative blundering took an otherwise serious financial crisis and molested it into an epic financial collapse.

By fully assuming the liabilities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two colossal and corrupt (and conduit of corruptness funneling junk Countrywide Financial loans onto the implied balance sheet of the federal government) government sponsored enterprises, the federal government, led by Treasury Secretary Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, has thrust taxpayers into an abyss of insolvency with one mighty shove.

Given the sheer size of these government sponsored companies, with loan guarantee obligations recently estimated by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis President William Poole of totaling $4.47 Trillion (That’s TRILLION with a capital T… for perspective ALL U.S. government debt held by the public totals roughly $4.87 Trillion) this legislative reversal making certain the “implied” government guarantee is reckless to say the least.

The following chart (click for larger ultra-dynamic and surf-able chart) shows what Fannie Mae terms the count of “Seriously Delinquent” loans as a percentage of all loans on their books.

It’s important to understand that Fannie Mae does NOT segregate foreclosures from delinquent loans when reporting these numbers.

Finally, the following chart (click for larger ultra-dynamic and surf-able chart) shows the relative movements of Fannie Mae’s credit and non-credit enhanced (insured and non-insured) “Seriously Delinquent” loans.

Ticking Prime Bomb!: Fannie Mae Monthly Summary September 2009

Decades from now the summer of 2008 will likely be remembered to mark the turning point where legislative blundering took an otherwise serious financial crisis and molested it into an epic financial collapse.

By fully assuming the liabilities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two colossal and corrupt (and conduit of corruptness funneling junk Countrywide Financial loans onto the implied balance sheet of the federal government) government sponsored enterprises, the federal government, led by Treasury Secretary Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, has thrust taxpayers into an abyss of insolvency with one mighty shove.

Given the sheer size of these government sponsored companies, with loan guarantee obligations recently estimated by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis President William Poole of totaling $4.47 Trillion (That’s TRILLION with a capital T… for perspective ALL U.S. government debt held by the public totals roughly $4.87 Trillion) this legislative reversal making certain the “implied” government guarantee is reckless to say the least.

The following chart (click for larger ultra-dynamic and surf-able chart) shows what Fannie Mae terms the count of “Seriously Delinquent” loans as a percentage of all loans on their books.

It’s important to understand that Fannie Mae does NOT segregate foreclosures from delinquent loans when reporting these numbers.

Finally, the following chart (click for larger ultra-dynamic and surf-able chart) shows the relative movements of Fannie Mae’s credit and non-credit enhanced (insured and non-insured) “Seriously Delinquent” loans.

Ticking Time Bomb?: Fannie Mae Monthly Summary September 2008

Decades from now the summer of 2008 will likely be remembered to mark the turning point where legislative blundering took an otherwise serious financial crisis and molested it into an epic financial collapse.

By fully assuming the liabilities of Fannie Mae (NYSE:FNM) and Freddie Mac (NYSE:FRE), the two colossal and corrupt (and conduit of corruptness funneling junk Countrywide Financial loans onto the implied balance sheet of the federal government) government sponsored enterprises, the federal government, led by Treasury Secretary Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, has thrust taxpayers into an abyss of insolvency with one mighty shove.

Given the sheer size of these government sponsored companies, with loan guarantee obligations recently estimated by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis President William Poole of totaling $4.47 Trillion (That’s TRILLION with a capital T… for perspective ALL U.S. government debt held by the public totals roughly $4.87 Trillion) this legislative reversal making certain the “implied” government guarantee is reckless to say the least.

The following chart (click for larger) shows what Fannie Mae terms the count of “Seriously Delinquent” loans as a percentage of all loans on their books.

It’s important to understand that Fannie Mae does NOT segregate foreclosures from delinquent loans when reporting these numbers and that should they report the delinquent results as a percentage of the unpaid principle balance, things might likely look a lot worse.

Finally, the following chart (click for larger) shows the relative movements of Fannie Mae’s credit and non-credit enhanced (insured and non-insured) “Seriously Delinquent” loans.

Ticking Time Bomb?: Fannie Mae Monthly Summary July 2008

With the signing of the housing “relief” act, the process has now officially begun in what will be not only the largest taxpayer bailout of private enterprise in history but the largest legislative blunder as well.

Allowing the Treasury Department of an immensely debt-laden country carte-blanche to utilize taxpayer money to engineer an essentially unaudited unwind of the GSEs, the two massive risk-laden failures, seems to smack of the essence of the times and further, at least in my mind, marks a decisive push into the absurd that would likely precede a wider scale collapse of our economic system.

Given the sheer size of these government sponsored companies, with loan guarantee obligations recently estimated by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis President William Poole of totaling $4.47 Trillion (That’s TRILLION with a capital T… for perspective ALL U.S. government debt held by the public totals roughly $4.87 Trillion) and the “fuzzy” interpretation of their “implied” overall Federal government guarantee should they experience systemic crisis, these changes are reckless to say the least.

The following chart (click for larger) shows what Fannie Mae terms the count of “Seriously Delinquent” loans as a percentage of all loans on their books.

It’s important to understand that Fannie Mae does NOT segregate foreclosures from delinquent loans when reporting these numbers and that should they report the delinquent results as a percentage of the unpaid principle balance, things would likely look a lot worse.

Finally, the following chart (click for larger) shows the relative movements of Fannie Mae’s credit and non-credit enhanced (insured and non-insured) “Seriously Delinquent” loans.

Move Over Sub-Prime

With all the news lately concerning the sub-prime meltdown and its considerable effects on commercial (private and public) lending institutions it’s easy to forget that nearly 50% of all mortgage debt is held by the two main government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

These two organizations, though purportedly operating both to the benefit of the public and within certain constraints not required by commercial lenders are not immune from the very same risks that commercial lenders face when managing a large portfolio of debt.

To the contrary, it appears quite possible that because of the GSEs special status and federal entanglement, they may actually be presenting a greater risk of failure, and the possible systemic fallout that could follow, than any of the larger commercial lenders.

Although the GSEs don’t technically write sub-prime or alt-A loans and restrict their lending activities exclusively to conforming loans, they have not been immune from the current culture of excessive lending.

It’s important to note that nearly 6% of GSE debt is composed of ARM loans.

Additionally, at least 3% of GSE fixed and adjustable rate loans have “interest only” options.

Furthermore, the OFHEO limit for conforming single family loan soared to a lofty $417,000 during the historic housing boom.

In a speech given last week, Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke suggested that the GSEs have taken on more risk than typical commercial lending institutions, function with far less “market force” scrutiny than comparable commercial lenders and don’t even fulfill the public objectives set out for them by the federal government.

“The regulatory framework under which the GSEs operate has two principal objectives: first, to support the GSEs’ mission of promoting homeownership, especially access to affordable housing; and second, to ensure that these two companies operate in a financially prudent manner.”

“This line of business [the GSEs] has raised public concern because its fundamental source of profitability is the widespread perception by investors that the U.S. government would not allow a GSE to fail, notwithstanding the fact that--as numerous government officials have asserted--the government has given no such guarantees.”

“Consequently, the GSEs’ ability to borrow at a preferential rate provides them with strong incentives both to expand the range of assets that they acquire and to increase the size of their portfolios to the greatest extent possible.”

“… they [GSE Portfolios] are not only large but also potentially subject to significant volatility and financial risk (including credit risk, interest-rate risk, and prepayment risk) and operational risk. Many observers, including the Federal Reserve Board, have expressed concern about the potential danger that these portfolios may pose to the broader financial system; that is, the GSE portfolios may be a source of systemic risk. … with possibly serious implications for the performance of the broader economy.”

“Unlike other private firms, however, the GSEs face little or no market discipline from their senior debt holders because of the belief among market participants that the U.S. government will back these institutions under almost any circumstances.”

“… because of both regulatory requirements and the force of market discipline, banks hold much more capital than GSEs hold. The very largest bank holding companies generally hold equity capital equal to 6 percent or more of assets, and the largest regional banks generally have capital ratios of about 8 percent. (As I am sure you are keenly aware, community banks often have a capital-to-assets ratio exceeding 10 percent.) In comparison, the GSEs hold capital equal to roughly 3.5 percent of assets. The justification for the low capital holdings of GSEs relative to banks is unclear.”

“However, evidence that Fannie and Freddie have had beneficial effects on the supply of affordable housing (over and above the benefits of their securitization activities for the mortgage market as a whole) has been difficult to find. After conducting several studies of the effects of GSEs on the mortgage market and establishing the GSEs’ disappointing results”

housing+bubble housing bubble bernanke Federal+Reserve greenspan economy recession GSE fredddie+mac fannie+mae loan lending lenders subprime ARM

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