Showing posts with label lending. Show all posts
Showing posts with label lending. Show all posts

Friday, June 29, 2007

OFHEO’s Absurd Sleight of Hand

This week the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) published a request for public comment regarding its proposed policy changes to the procedures used to determine the conforming loan limit for 2008 and beyond.

The conforming loan limit is the maximum loan size that the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSE), namely Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, can purchase and today stands at $417,000.

The importance of this value should not be overlooked as it is the key determining factor that distinguishes GSE purchased loans, which generally come with a lower interest rate due to a presumed (yet not necessarily factual) government guarantee, from “Jumbo” loans which are available unfettered from private lending institutions.

In fact, OFHEO considers loans purchased by a GSE in excess of its conforming loan limit to be “unsafe and unsound practice, running contrary to statute”.

That said, the proposed changes relate to the method of determining the limit in the face of declining home prices.

First, it’s important to note that the method for determining the limit when prices are climbing is relatively simple.

The Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB) confidentially delivers the results of their October Monthly Interest Rate Survey (MIRS) to OFHEO which intern applies a calculation to the average home price to determine the new maximum lending limit.

OFHEO then announces publicly the new limit for loans made during the following year.

Simple enough… October average home price + some calculation = new maximum limit.

So what is the issue you say?

It seems that OFHEO is struggling with the idea of applying that same simple methodology when prices are on the decline.

Reading the proposed procedures, it’s clear that the government has a bias toward inflating home values and is doing just about everything it can to maintain the current limit under the guise of not negatively impacting the market.

This is really an outrageous matter when one considers that the ever increasing limit, that was even a surprise to mortgage brokers and lenders during the boom years, had without a doubt contributed to fueling the housing mania.

With the proposed changes, a downward revision to the limit, even in the face of falling home prices, may be deferred for as long as 2-3 years or more.

I would strongly urge that you let OFHEO know what you think of their proposed changes as well as making your own recommendations by emailing OFHEO at the following email address ofheoguidancecomments@ofheo.gov.

Below are the proposed procedures for setting the limit when home values are declining:
  1. In a year in which the October house price level is lower than the level of the previous October, OFHEO will defer the impact of that decline on the conforming loan limit for one full year. The effect of the price level decline of 0.16% from October 2005 to October 2006 was deferred in this manner.

  2. After deferring the impact of a decline in the average price level for one year

    (A) if the price level falls in the following year, the latter decline will be deferred one year, and the maximum loan limit will be adjusted by the decline of the former year. However, the decrease will be deferred to the next year unless it exceeds one percent (1%); or
    (B) if the price level increases the following year, then the prior year’s (or years’) decline(s) will be subtracted from such increase, unless such subtraction(s) result(s) in a decrease of less than 1%, in which case such decrease will be carried forward to the next year.

  3. All loans that were within the conforming loan limit at the time of origination will continue to be deemed within the conforming loan limit during the remaining lives of such loans, regardless of whether the loan limit for any subsequent year declines to a level below the limit at the time of origination.
And here is an example of the actual implementation of these procedures:

In November 2007,

(a) if the average house purchase price has gone up during the year, for example by 2 percent, the deferred decline of 0.16 percent would be subtracted, and the new loan limit beginning January 2008 would show an increase of 1.84 percent.

(b) if the average house purchase price has gone up during the year, for example by 0.10 percent, then the deferred decline would offset that 0.10 percent increase and a 0.06 decline would be carried forward. The conforming loan limit would remain the same at $417,000.

(c) if the average house purchase price has gone down, the conforming loan limit will remain at $417,000 for 2008.

The deferred decline will be added to the 0.16 percent and carried forward until the next calculation in November 2008, as follows:

(i) if the average house purchase price goes up during 2008, the conforming loan limit will be calculated per (a) or (b) above with the offset being the cumulative deferred decline of 0.16% and the November 2007 decline;

(ii) if the average house purchase price goes down during 2008 and the cumulative deferred decline of 0.16 percent from 2006 and the decline from 2007 coupled with the 2008 decline still total less than 1 percent, the conforming loan limit would remain at $417,000 in 2009; or,

(iii) if the average house purchase price goes down during 2008 and the cumulative deferred decline of 0.16 percent from 2006 and the decline from 2007 and 2008 totals 1.0 percent or greater, then the conforming loan limit for 2009 will be adjusted downward by that cumulative deferred decline.

Tuesday, March 13, 2007

Move Over Sub-Prime

With all the news lately concerning the sub-prime meltdown and its considerable effects on commercial (private and public) lending institutions it’s easy to forget that nearly 50% of all mortgage debt is held by the two main government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

These two organizations, though purportedly operating both to the benefit of the public and within certain constraints not required by commercial lenders are not immune from the very same risks that commercial lenders face when managing a large portfolio of debt.

To the contrary, it appears quite possible that because of the GSEs special status and federal entanglement, they may actually be presenting a greater risk of failure, and the possible systemic fallout that could follow, than any of the larger commercial lenders.

Although the GSEs don’t technically write sub-prime or alt-A loans and restrict their lending activities exclusively to conforming loans, they have not been immune from the current culture of excessive lending.

It’s important to note that nearly 6% of GSE debt is composed of ARM loans.

Additionally, at least 3% of GSE fixed and adjustable rate loans have “interest only” options.

Furthermore, the OFHEO limit for conforming single family loan soared to a lofty $417,000 during the historic housing boom.

In a speech given last week, Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke suggested that the GSEs have taken on more risk than typical commercial lending institutions, function with far less “market force” scrutiny than comparable commercial lenders and don’t even fulfill the public objectives set out for them by the federal government.

“The regulatory framework under which the GSEs operate has two principal objectives: first, to support the GSEs’ mission of promoting homeownership, especially access to affordable housing; and second, to ensure that these two companies operate in a financially prudent manner.”

“This line of business [the GSEs] has raised public concern because its fundamental source of profitability is the widespread perception by investors that the U.S. government would not allow a GSE to fail, notwithstanding the fact that--as numerous government officials have asserted--the government has given no such guarantees.”

“Consequently, the GSEs’ ability to borrow at a preferential rate provides them with strong incentives both to expand the range of assets that they acquire and to increase the size of their portfolios to the greatest extent possible.”

“… they [GSE Portfolios] are not only large but also potentially subject to significant volatility and financial risk (including credit risk, interest-rate risk, and prepayment risk) and operational risk. Many observers, including the Federal Reserve Board, have expressed concern about the potential danger that these portfolios may pose to the broader financial system; that is, the GSE portfolios may be a source of systemic risk. … with possibly serious implications for the performance of the broader economy.”

“Unlike other private firms, however, the GSEs face little or no market discipline from their senior debt holders because of the belief among market participants that the U.S. government will back these institutions under almost any circumstances.”

“… because of both regulatory requirements and the force of market discipline, banks hold much more capital than GSEs hold. The very largest bank holding companies generally hold equity capital equal to 6 percent or more of assets, and the largest regional banks generally have capital ratios of about 8 percent. (As I am sure you are keenly aware, community banks often have a capital-to-assets ratio exceeding 10 percent.) In comparison, the GSEs hold capital equal to roughly 3.5 percent of assets. The justification for the low capital holdings of GSEs relative to banks is unclear.”

“However, evidence that Fannie and Freddie have had beneficial effects on the supply of affordable housing (over and above the benefits of their securitization activities for the mortgage market as a whole) has been difficult to find. After conducting several studies of the effects of GSEs on the mortgage market and establishing the GSEs’ disappointing results”